Mr Daniel had just secured what he believed to be a major breakthrough in his career.

As a young contractor trying to establish himself, landing a contract with a well-known construction company felt like a dream come true.

The negotiations were brief. The company presented him with a contract document outlining the terms of the engagement. Excited by the opportunity and eager not to lose the deal, Mr Daniel paid little attention to the details. He skimmed through a few lines, ignored the bulk of the document, and promptly appended his signature.To him, the most important thing was simple: he had gotten the job.

Work commenced almost immediately. However, as the project progressed, Mr Daniel began to encounter difficulties. Payments were delayed, certain unexpected obligations were imposed on him, and he was required to bear costs he never anticipated.

Confused, he went back to the contract he had signed.

This time, he read it carefully. To his shock, the document clearly contained clauses that:

Everything he was experiencing had already been written, he simply had not taken the time to see it.

Feeling frustrated and unfairly treated, Mr Daniel sought legal advice. He argued that the terms were harsh and that he never knowingly agreed to them.

However, the legal position was not in his favour.

He was informed that under the law of contract, a person who signs a contractual document is generally bound by its contents, whether or not they have read or understood it.

To explain this principle, reference was made to the case of L’Estrange v Graucob Ltd (1934).

In that case, Mrs L’Estrange signed an agreement for the purchase of a vending machine without reading it. The document contained a clause excluding liability for defects. When the machine turned out to be faulty, she sought to avoid the contract on the ground that she was unaware of the clause.The court held that her signature bound her to the terms of the document. The fact that she did not read it was irrelevant, as there was no fraud or misrepresentation.

Applying this principle to Mr Daniel’s situation, it became clear that his case was similar. He had voluntarily signed the contract, and there was no evidence that he had been deceived or forced into doing so. The unfavourable terms, though burdensome, were legally binding.

Mr Daniel’s experience illustrates a fundamental rule in contract law:a signature is treated as clear evidence of consent.

His excitement had secured him the contract—but his failure to read it had defined its consequences.